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Until the 1970s, scholars routinely asserted that courts in the late nineteenth
century initiated a radical reinterpretation of due process of law in their attempt to
stem an onrushing tide of legislation designed to regulate business activity. Alfred
H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison expressed the conventional wisdom in their
widely-used constitutional history textbook when they wrote:
What business needed was a means whereby the prevailing doctrine of laissez-
faire economic theory could be written into constitutional law as a positive pro-
tection against "unreasonable" legislation.
... [B]etween 1873 and 1898, the Supreme Court revolutionized the his-
toric interpretation of due process of law and thus established the Fourteenth
Amendment as the specific constitutional authorization for the doctrine of vested
rights.1
This protection-of-business theory of due process development originated with
the efforts of socialist and progressive commentators of the early twentieth cen-
tury to discredit what they saw as a "revolutionary" transformation of due process
from a term of "nominal significance in American constitutional law" into a bul-
wark of property.2 Marxist theoretician and lawyer Louis B. Boudin contended
that courts had perpetrated a "great revolution in our political institutions" through
their interpretation of due process.3 Where the phrase had once meant fair proce-
dure, wrote Boudin, it had now been contorted to ensure natural justice, as under-
stood by the courts.4 By assuming the power to review the substance of laws, the
courts had arrogated legislative functions to themselves at the expense of the people
and their elected representatives. 5 Socialist muckraker and historian Gustavus
Myers pointed out the reason for this doctrinal revolution: the great railroad cor-
porations had taken control of the state and federal judiciaries had become the
"sovereign power."'6
Progressive intellectuals assailed the judiciary in similar terms. Yale Univer-
sity president Arthur T. Hadley, an expert in railroad law and economics, declared
that judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment had given corporations
* Ohio Legislative Service Commission; B.A., 1972, History and Political Science, SUNY
Binghamton; J.D., 1976, M.A., 1977, and Ph.D., 1982, Ohio State University.
1. ALuRo H. KELLY & Wueam A. HARBIsON, THE A ucAN CoNsmTnON: ITS OluotIs AND
DEVELOPMENT 470 (5th ed. 1976).
2. CHARLES GRovEHAmTEsTHAm iucANDoc mnoFJDICLALSUtMAcY 411 (2d ed. 1932).
3. Louis B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 PoL Sci. Q. 238,270 (1911).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 265-70.
6. GusTAVus MYERS, HsmRY OF TE SUPR E CouRT oF Tm Urn STATEs 528 (1912).
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"large powers and privileges" and placed them beyond popular control. Alabama
attorney, archeologist, and linguist Charles Wallace Collins claimed that the Four-
teenth Amendment had been "practically appropriated by the corporations" so that
it operated "to protect the rights of property to the detriment of the rights of man " 8
Constitutional scholars, including Edward S. Corwin and Charles Grove Haines,
lent their support to the themes purveyed by Collins and company. Neither Corwin
nor Haines engaged in unrestrained corporation-bashing or class-conflict theoriz-
ing, but both maintained that a major transformation in the meaning of due process
had occurred since the 1870s and that the Fourteenth Amendment had become the
constitutional bastion of property rights.9
The protection-of-business thesis enjoyed a long reign, although the rather
crude class-conflict interpretation of some of the early critics gave way to more
subtle analyses. Scholars argued that substantive due process resulted from the
wide-spread acceptance of laissez-faire economic theory in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and that the similar social backgrounds of many business
leaders and judges led them to adopt like attitudes toward regulatory legislation. 10
But in one form or another, the view that laissez-faire constitutionalism and its
chief doctrinal component, substantive due process, arose as a means of protecting
business from governmental control remained the standard one until the 1970s. 11
Since the late 1960s, historians have challenged the protection-of-business
theory. They have pointed out, first, that most regulatory legislation in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries survived judicial scrutiny at both the state
and federal levels. 12 Second, they have argued that laissez- faire constitutionalism
stemmed from Jacksonian egalitarianism. State favoritism toward corporate enter-
prise--in the form of subsidies, tax exemptions, and other privileges-and not the
regulation of business, had led courts to strike down economic legislation while
developing broader concepts of due process.13 By the 1990s, the revisionist inter-
7. HAnis, supra note 2, at 340 (quoting Arthur Twining Hadley, The Constitutional Position
of Property, 64 Ihm'. 836-37 (1908)).
8. CHAuas WALLAcE Counis, THE FouiENm AmEnrmo.urr AND Tim Smm 137-38 (1912).
9. See Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 tcdt. L
REv. 643 (1909); HAms, supra note 2, at 293-3 11.
10. See BmeAsmw R. Twiss, LAwYmS AD "m CoNsnirnoN 5-13. 142-44 (1942); Ki.y &
HAiSON, supra note 1, at 470,482.
11. See, e.g., CLYDE E. JAcoBS, LAw WnrrnRs AND mm CotRrs 45-58 (1954); Sm.irE Fbem.
LAsEzFAum -Dm G~ ERA-WE SrA E 126-64 (The University of Michigan Press 1964)
(1956); RoBaer G. McCtoss~y, THE Ai~tuAmc SoRvmn Cotnrr 102-05,115-35 (1960); Arnam
SEwYN MnRan, THE SuRanm CouRT ANDmuc CA rrusM 50-62 (1968); PAUL B RESr, Pxio-
CESSES OF CONS1F-nUONAL DECSioNmAmaO 718-25 (1975); ALPmUS THmos Mso. & Wu.ITA
M. BEANEY, AimmcAN CoNsnrunoNAL LAw 356-59 (6th ed. 1978). The traditional view is still
current in constitutional law texts and treatises. See, e.g., 2 RoNAmw D. RoTMnA. & JoMi E.
NowAxt, TRa'AsE ON CoNsTIUUoNAL LAw: SuBsrNcE AND Pocmtmn § 15.2 (3d ed. 1999).
12. See JOHN E. S-1oNcam, CHGmiNo Tm FunrRE 424-25 (1978); Melvin L Urofsky, State
Courts andProgressive Legislation during the Progressive Era. A Reevaluation, 72 J. A. Htsr.
63 (1985) [hereinafter Urofsky, State Courts]; Melvin L Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Su-
preme Court andProtective Legislation in the Progressive Era, Sup. Cr. HisT. Soc'y YEAXnWor.
1983, at 53 [hereinafter Urofsky, Myth and Reality].
13. See HowARD Gnu.ANi-lTHE CosrnnoN BEsmam (1993); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-
Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitution-
alism, 3 LAw & HlT. REv. 293 (1985); David M. Gold, Redfield Railroads, and the Roots of
"Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism," 27 Am. J.L. t HisT. 254 (1983); Alan Jones, Thomas Mf.
Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism":A Reconsideration, 53 J. Am. HST. 751 (1967);
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations,
61 J. Am. HIST. 970 (1975).
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pretation had become so common, complained one skeptical scholar, that it had
replaced the traditional view.14
If the great bulk of economic legislation passed muster, then what was the
laissez-faire constitutionalism perceived by both contemporary critics of the courts
and later historians, including revisionists? Melvin I. Urofsky, after studying Su-
preme Court and state court decisions of the Progressive era, suggested that it
never existed; he concluded that the story of a reactionary Supreme Court was a
myth created by muckraking writers who focused on decisions they disliked and
ignored the majority of cases that sustained reforms. 15 Other historians have not
gone so far. Paul Kens notes that the existence of laissez-faire constitutionalism
cannot be proved or disproved simply by counting up cases. 16 Reformers attacked
the Supreme Court, writes Kens, because the Court set up hoops for them to jump
through, making itself the final arbiter of the reasonableness of legislation. 17 Kens
concludes that the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the police power and
its use of "substantive due process to review the content of state legislation," be-
ginning in 1877, did indeed add up to "a revolution in constitutional law," a revo-
lution influenced by "laissez faire individualism." 18
Kens has expanded upon this theme in his biography of Supreme Court Jus-
tice Stephen J. Field. 19 According to Kens, Field represented the "radical indi-
vidualist" as opposed to the "reformist" wing of the Jacksonian legacy 20 Field
believed that government should neither confer special privileges upon corpora-
tions nor inhibit the activities of corporations simply because they had grown pow-
erful. Rejecting the assertion that Field felt ill at ease with corporate power, Kens
argues that Field formulated substantive due process doctrine for the purpose of
removing governmental obstacles to corporate conduct.21
William Wiecek, too, lends support to the idea that laissez-faire constitution-
alism, with substantive due process as its "doctrinal credo," emerged in the late
nineteenth century as a means of protecting business from governmental regula-
tion.22 Wiecek writes that the "legal classicism" of the time arose from a fear of
disorder and social disintegration and concomitant threats to vested rights. 23 By
the 1870s, the antebellum tradition of higher law in which courts invoked natural
law to limit legislative power over property was defunct. In searching for consti-
tutional text in which to anchor their control over legislatures, judges hit upon due
process of law. State courts led the way between 1885 and 1900, but thereafter
14. See Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and Laissez Faire
Constitutionalism, 1900-1937, 35 Am. J. LEGA. HsT. 70 (1991) [hereinafter Kens, Source of a
Myth]. See also PAuL KEus, JuSncE STEPHEN Fma.D: SHAPINO LmERTY FROM THE GOLD RuSH TO MIe
GILDED AoE 266-75 (1997) [hereinafter KENs, JusncE STEPHEN FISLD].
15. See Urofsky, Myth and Reality, supra note 12, at 69.
16. See Kens, Source of a Myth, supra note 14, at 72.
17. See U
18. Id. at 77. Lawrence M. Friedman explains the "constitutional madness" of the late nine-
teenth century in similar terms. LAWRENCE M. FRIaznwA, A HIsToRY OF AmA iu LAw 361 (2d
ed. 1985).
19. See KENs, Jus'ncE STmPEN FiEzD, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 9, 266-75.
21. See KENs, JusTicE STEPHEN FIELD, supra note 14, at 8-9, 266- 75.
22. WILLI M. WiEcE, THE Losr WORLD OF CL.AssC A. LEGAL THouGHT 124 (1998).
23. Id. at 79-88.
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retreated in the face of legislative resolve. However, the United States Supreme
Court picked up the slack and enshrined substantive due process in federal consti-
tutional law as a limitation on state regulatory power.24
There is a significant measure of truth in the new protection-of-business inter-
pretation of laissez-faire constitutionalism and substantive due process, as there
was in the old. Many businessmen and jurists feared the social turmoil and activist
legislatures of the turbulent post-war period. Some courts displayed a conspicu-
ous hostility toward certain types of economic legislation, particularly labor laws.25
But the revisionist insight that laissez-faire constitutionalism originated in an older
tradition of Jacksonian egalitarianism remains, in NWiecek's words, "valid beyond
cavil."26 Wlecek challenges revisionism as incomplete, not inaccurate 2 7 Fur-
thermore, despite the measure of truth in the protection-of-business theory, there is
an explanation for the rise of substantive due process that has nothing to do with
any antiregulatory animus on the part of the courts. It is based on a constitutional
tradition of substantive judicial review.
Haines and Corwin both wrote in detail about the sources of substantive judi-
cial review--the review by courts of the content of laws enacted in accordance
with proper legislative procedure-locating them in early American constitutional
thought.28 Rather than seeing substantive due process as part of a larger tradition
of substantive judicial review, however, they perceived a radical reinterpretation
of due process. Some revisionists, on the other hand, have noted a continuity in
due process thinking from pre-Civil War times to the posthelum era,29 but even
among revisionists there is a tendency to view late nineteenth-century substantive
due process as innovative and in some instances pernicious. Herbert Hovenkamp
relates substantive due process to a laissez-faire moral philosophy that predated
the Civil War, but he does not question the novelty of substantive due process
itself.30 In his seminal article on Thomas M. Cooley and laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism, Alan Jones sought to rehabilitate Cooley's reputation by dissociating
him from later judges, especially Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer, who
"range[d] far afield in their definitions of 'due process of law."' 3 1 More recently,
Edward Keynes, while stressing the ancient English origins of substantive due
process and the pre-Civil War appearance of the concept in a few American cases
24. See id. at 124-36.
25. See MOrON KELn, AFFAws OF STAE 404-08 (1977); Wmc=. supra note 22, at 127-32;
JACOBS, supra note 11, at 50-58, 64-85.
26. WincEn, supra note 22, at 108.
27. See id,
28. See HAuIS, supra note 2 at 340. See generally Edward S. Corwin. The Basic Doctrine of
American Constitutionai Law, 12 MxcH. L. Ray. 247 (1914).
29. See BENmcr, supra note 13, at 323-31; Gajum, supra note 13, at 53-60, 86-99, 106-07.
James W. Ely, Jr., sees an antebellum substantive due process emerging from the concepts of
vested rights, just compensation, and public purpose. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oymoron
Reconsidered. Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Co.\ST. CoNZME-
RY 315 (1999).
30. See HEREr HOVEAh', EmERPRISE AND AmmucA LAw, 1836-1937, at 67-69, 171-82
(1991).
31. Jones, supra note 13, at 761. Jones characterized Justice Brewer as a defender of "class
privilege and concentrated corporate power," id at 752, but Brewer has since undergone a rein-
terpretation similar to the one Jones applied to Cooley. See generally licHAEL. J. BRO)HEAD
DAVID J. BREwou THE Lnw OF A SUPREm COURT JUSTICa, 1837-1910 (1994).
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and treatises, has regarded these appearances primarily as precursors of a phenom-
enon that flowered only after 1873.32
The aura of novelty fades, however, when substantive due process is seen as
part of a larger tradition of substantive judicial review. By the middle of the nine-
teenth century, courts had grown accustomed to using judicial review to pass upon
the political judgments of legislatures.33 But courts did not employ judicial re-
view to radically restructure government-business relations. Roscoe Pound pos-
ited the existence of a deeply rooted "taught legal tradition" in accordance with
which judges sought to adjust human relations on the basis of principles and of
rules logically derived from them.34 Judges trained in the tradition made their
adjustments incrementally, adapting the law to economic change gradually, with-
out seeking to advance the interests of particular groups in society.3 5 In a recent
study focusing on grants of corporate charters, public aid to corporations in the
form of subsidization and eminent-domain privileges, and lawsuits against corpo-
rations, Peter Karsten points out that nineteenth-century judges did not generally
join in the popular and legislative "Hymn to Growth."'36 Believing that corpora-
tions required careful watching more than encouragement, the courts tended rather
to affirm "ancient legal principles" in defense of "the public good."37
If judges generally shared a commitment to established legal principles and
methods of deciding cases, a commitment that resisted social and economic pres-
sures, then constitutional revolutions should have been rare, and the presumption
should be against their occurrence. Was there, then, a judicial-review revolution
in the era of laissez-faire constitutionalism, as has generally been maintained? That
courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries engaged in substantive
judicial review is beyond question. As Kens observes, the fact that courts let most
laws stand does not mean that they refrained from reviewing their substance. 38
However, the exercise of this power was not a radical departure from judicial tra-
dition. This becomes clear when one examines all the guises in which substantive
judicial review appeared. Most scholars have identified substantive judicial re-
view with substantive due process of law, which placed certain fundamental rights
beyond the reach of legislative action. But due process was only one constitu-
tional basis for judicial examination of the substance of legislation. Anyone who
looks only at due process doctrine will miss the other forms substantive judicial
review took, from the early nineteenth century through the twentieth, and will
32. See EDwmw KEYE, L,mmi y, PRoPmTY, AND PRvACY 6-14,20-29, 100-28 (1996).
33. See William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of
Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 1166 (1972).
34. RoscoE PouND, THE FoRmATVE ERA OF AMEUCAN LAw 81 (1938).
35. See PouND supra note 34, at 81-137; Roscoe Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the
Law of Torts, 53 Harv. L. Rav. 365, 366-68 (1940).
36. Peter Karsten, Supervising the "Spoiled Children of Legislation": Judicial Judgments
Involving Quasi-Public Corporations in the Nineteenth Century U.S., 41 Am. J. LoAL hisr. 315,
315 (1997).
37. lId 315-16. William I. Novak has also described an American legal tradition based upon
the maxim saluspopuli suprema lex est, but he sees a radical break with that tradition in the rise
of substantive due process, beginning with liquor-law cases in the 1850s and building up to a
profound transformation of basic concepts of law and society after 1877. See WnI.M J. NovAX,
THE PEoPLE's WEuARE 184-88, 244-48 (1996).
38. See Kens, Source of a Myth, supra note 14, at 72,77-78, 97.
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therefore likely understate the venerability of this judicial power and overestimate
the "revolution" in posthellum constitutional law.
Furthermore, students of the history of substantive judicial review must modify
their method of analyzing the subject. They generally base their analyses on se-
lected cases from state courts around the country, or on decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, or on judicial biographies. But studying substantive judi-
cial review through choice examples from scattered jurisdictions can make the
exceptional appear to be the norm. A concentration on the Supreme Court can be
misleading, because the Supreme Court had few occasions to consider regulatory
legislation before the Civil War. Biographical studies focus on the thought of
individuals, who may or may not be representative. In this Article, I use a different
approach, examining more than a century's worth of decisions of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine. Such an analysis of cases in an individual jurisdiction
over an extended period of time avoids the problem of selectivity and likely distor-
tion inherent in other methodologies.
A single study of this sort has its own problem of selectivity, of course, and
therefore must be suggestive rather than conclusive. However, Maine is an appro-
priate jurisdiction with which to start. For much of the nineteenth century, Maine
was a middle-sized state in both geographical extent and population. Even at
century's end, by which time the addition of large Western and Midwestern states
had significantly lowered Maine's rankings, Maine exceeded ten other states in
area and fourteen in population.3 9 Economically, nineteenth-century Maine pre-
sented the intriguing picture of a long-settled, developed eastern state with a fron-
tier as rough-and-ready as any found in the west, although its folk heroes were
lumberjacks and sailors rather than cowboys and sodbusters. Maine's forests, riv-
ers, and Atlantic shoreline made it the nation's leading lumbering and shipbuilding
state for decades, and one of the great commercial fishing states as well. Maine
did not develop heavy industry to match that of the mid-Atlantic and Midwestern
states, and the increased use of steel contributed to the decline of Maine's ship-
building industry as the century closed. However, the pulp and paper industry
took its place. Maine ranked seventh in papermaking in 1879, third in 1900.40
Light industry played a major role in Maine's economic life; around 1900, Maine
was among the leaders in production of woollen and cotton goods, shoes, and
canned and preserved fish. The state ranked twenty-first among the forty-five
states in value of manufactured goods produced.4 1
Maine's major metropolis was Portland, which in the middle of the century
aspired to rival Boston as a commercial center. Although the grandiose dreams of
John A. Poor and other boosters never came to fruition, Portland did become a
major regional trading center after the completion, with the aid of municipal credit,
of the Grand Trnk railway system in the 1850s. In the 1890s Portland also be-
came the hub of a booming tourist business. The hotel, convention, and retail
39. Maine's territorial ranking at various times can be extrapolated from generally available
figures on states' sizes and their dates of admission to the Union. See EN-CaOOAB=Ar,-CA,
Maine, 689 (14th ed. 1964) (regarding population statistics)
40. See generally id. at 690-91 (discussing the evolution of and trend in Maine's economic
growth).
41. See G. W. Stephens, The Industrial Development of Maine, in ,Wnm 661-685 (Louis C.
Hatch ed., 1973) (1919). See also E CYCLOmDn1 BI m'rAmm Maine, 434 (11th ed. 1961).
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trades flourished with the influx of summer visitors. At the same time, Portland
superseded Lewiston as Maine's chief manufacturing city; industrial expositions
and other forms of promotion helped continue a modest growth in light industry
into the twentieth century.42
Maine's state and local governments reflected national trends in the ups and
downs of business promotion, especially in the subsidization of railroads after the
Civil War. Between 1830 and 1889, the state legislature enacted seventy-seven
special laws authorizing local governmental aid to railroads; forty-three were passed
in the years 1866-1873. 4 3 Challenges to governmental attempts to foster industry
after the Civil War led the Maine court to issue several classic laissez-faire opin-
ions, and during the Progressive era, the court had to deal with labor and environ-
mental laws and the regulation of utility rates. Maine is therefore constitutionally,
territorially, demographically, and economically an excellent subject for a case
study of substantive judicial review.
II. SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MAINE BEFORE 1868
Antebellum courts overturned legislation reluctantly, but they took for granted
their power to review its content. Even in Commonwealth v. Alger,44 in what is
generally regarded as a classic argument for a wide-ranging police power, Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts repeatedly wrote that the legislature's power
was to enact reasonable laws, not any laws that might regulate property.45 Al-
though Shaw did not say explicitly that courts had the power to strike down unrea-
sonable laws, his emphasis on the constitutional limitation of reasonableness would
have been meaningless if courts had lacked the power. As Shaw had written in an
earlier opinion, in a limited government with a written constitution, the judiciary
clearly had the authority "to declare that a particular enactment is not warranted by
the power vested in the legislature, and therefore.., is... void.' 4 6 Courts based
their authority to review the content of legislation in part on the principle that
government could act only for the general welfare and not for the special benefit of
particular private interests. 47 For example, when confronted with a challenge to a
municipal bylaw that prohibited unlicensed individuals from carting refuse on the
grounds that it was monopolistic, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated: "If the regulation is unreasonable, it is void; if necessary for the good
government of the society, it is good.' 4 8 After explaining how reasonableness
should be determined, the court found the bylaw to be reasonable. 49
42. See 2 EDWARD CHASE KmnuAND, MEN, CrnEs AND TRAmPORTATON 192- 222 (1948); Robert
H. Babcock, The Rise and Fall of Portland's Waterfront, 1850-1920,22 ME. His. Soc'" Q. 63,
79-87 (1982).
43. See Carter Goodrich, Local Government Planning of Internal Improvements, 66 PoL
Sc. Q. 411,414 (1951).
44. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
45. See id at 85-86.
46. Wellington et al., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 96 (1834). See also Thorpe v. Rutland &
Burlington Railroad, 27 Vt. 140, 154 (1854) (a leading police powers case holding that the
legislature was competent to adopt "unjust or unreasonable laws" but explicitly finding that the
challenged statute was reasonable).
47. See GumAMN, supra note 13, at 49-53.
48. Vandine, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 187, 190 (1828).
49. See id. at 190-92.
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Courts also relied on the theory that American legislatures had only such pow-
ers as were delegated by the constitutions under which they operated. In the cel-
ebrated case of Taylor v. Porter,50 in which the New York court overturned a stat-
ute that granted eminent-domain privileges to builders of private roads, the court
observed that the legislature was not supreme and that when it stepped beyond the
bounds established by the constitution, its acts were void.5 1 The majority and
dissenting judges in Taylor agreed that private property could not be taken for
private use under the eminent-domain power, in disagreeing over whether the tak-
ing of property for private roads served a public purpose, both sides tacitly as-
sumed that the power to decide whether a purpose was public rested with the judi-
ciary. The New Jersey court faced the issue directly, explicitly rejecting the con-
tention that the legislature had the final say on whether a particular purpose was
public.52
The majority in Taylor also suggested that a proper regard for natural rights
justified substantive judicial review. 53 The Supreme Court of Indiana, nullifying a
statute in 1855, squarely rested its power of substantive judicial review on natural-
rights theory.5 4 Several courts, most famously the New York court in R5ynehamer
v. People,55 invoked substantive due process to invalidate laws before the Civil
War.56
Between the time Maine attained statehood in 1820 and the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine asserted or
implied that it had the power to review the substance of legislation on all these
grounds. The judges who rendered the decisions hailed from a variety of social
and political backgrounds. 57 Between 1820 and 1852, when the court consisted of
three and then four members, ten men served as justices.58 Most were Democrats,
some of them ardent and politically active Jacksonians, but at least two had been
Federalists in Congress and a third was a Whig. Most came from comfortable
economic circumstances, the sons of prosperous farmers or merchants, but Ezekiel
50. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843).
51. See ia at 148.
52. See Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., I NJ. Eq. 694, 727 (1832).
53. See Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hi at 146.
54. See Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501,502 (1855).
55. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
56. See id at 383. See also Benedict, supra note 13, at 326 n. 139, and Gnalt ,, supra note
13, at 53-54 (regarding citations to other cases).
57. The biographical information on Maine judges here and elsewhere in this Article comes
from several sources. Charles Hamlin published a series on the Supreme Judicial Court, with
profiles of many of the judges, under the title The Supreme Court of Maine. See Charles Hamlin,
The Supreme Court of Maine (pts. 1-6), in 7 THE GRnE BAo: AN E% 'ErAi',o MAcGL~m-E o,
LAwYERs 457 (1895), 7 THE GREN BAG 504,7 THE GREE BAG 553, 8THE GREEN BAG 14 (1896),
8 THE GRENa BAG 61, 8 THE GREEN BAG 111. The Report of the Maine State BarAssociation for
1920 and 1921 includes informative reminiscences and a list of all the judges to that point with
citations to proceedings held upon their retirements or deaths. See MAnmST nBARAss'NTHn
FnlsT CEN1r7URY OF TaE JURISPRUDOcE OF TIE STAE OF MAINE 242-51 (1921). TheAmerican Na-
tional Biography, the Dictionary ofAmerican Biography, and the National Cyclopedia ofAmeri-
can Biography contain entries for some of the judges, the first and second with citations to
sources. See AmEcANNAnoNALBtoRAPY(1999); DIcnoNARY oFAm1UcANBlotAPAm(1928-
36); NA ONAL CYC.OPEDIA OFAmEmicA BiocrAPH' (1898-1984).
58. See Hamlin (pt.1), supra note 57, at 462-64.
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Whitman, the third chief justice, had been orphaned as a young child and raised in
poverty.5 9
After statehood, the original court consisted of Chief Justice Prentiss Mellen,
aFederalist and leader of the Portland bar, and two Republican associates, William
Pitt Preble and Nathan Weston, Jr.6 0 Mellen, the son of a well-to-do Congrega-
tionalist minister, received the appointment as a reward for supporting statehood
for the strongly Jeffersonian District of Maine. Weston's father was active in com-
merce and politics, but Weston himself kept a low political profile. Preble loved
politics more than law. After abandoning the Federalists in 1814, he held various
public positions, though he was too irascible to reach high elective office, and
became an avid Jacksonian. Preble resigned from the bench in 1828, to be re-
placed by another Jacksonian politician, Albion K. Parris. Weston succeeded Mellen
as chiefjustice in 1834.61 Democrats predominated on the court until the political
realignment of the 1850s.
With the judicial reorganization of 1852, the court grew to seven members; 62
it would later fluctuate between seven and eight. The turbulent politics of the
1850s intruded upon the court, causing instability in the middle of the decade. By
1857, however, the new Republicans had acquired a strong grip on every branch of
state government, which they would hold for decades. After Richard Rice's resig-
nation in 1863, there would be no more Democrats on the court until the appoint-
ment of Artemas Libbey in 1875, when the parties agreed that the minority should
be represented on the bench. 63 The Republicans were a varied lot, however, made
up of ex-Whigs and ex-Democrats from every level of society. They included
former Whig governor Edward Kent, son of a wealthy Federalist merchant of New
Hampshire, and Jonathan G. Dickerson, scion of a prominent family of New Hamp-
shire Democrats and a former leader of the Wildcat faction of the party in Maine;
Charles Danforth and Charles G. Walton, self-made men of humble birth who had
worked their way up through the ranks in law and politics; and Woodbury Davis
and Seth May, temperance and antislavery activists. The differing political out-
looks of this diverse group of men sometimes surfaced in their judicial opinions,
but all the justices shared the "taught tradition"6 4 of the law, including the evolv-
ing tradition of judicial review.
Two early decisions laid the foundation for the jurisprudence of judicial re-
view in Maine. In both Proprietors of the Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree65 and
Lewis v. Webb,6 6 the legislature sought to undo judicial decisions through retroac-
tive laws. The court had no difficulty striking down the acts with reasoning that
applied equally to substantive and procedural challenges to state laws. Chief Jus-
tice Mellen, the author of both opinions, adverted to general principles of justice,
the declaration of natural rights in the state constitution, and the constitutional
provision that restricted legislative power to the adoption of reasonable laws.67
59. See id. at 470-72.
60. See id. at 462-65.
61. See id. at 467.
62. See id
63. See id at 464.
64. PotmD, supra note 34.
65. 2 Me. 275 (1823).
66. 3 Me. 326 (1825).
67. See Proprietors of the Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree, 2 Me. at 288-92; Lewis v. Webb, 3
Me. at 336-37.
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He regarded the definition of reasonableness as a matter of natural law, judicially
discovered, andin one of the cases explicitly held that the special legislative act on
behalf of a litigant was "neither just or reasonable." 68 (Preble, who missed the
argument of this case, took the pains to append a note on the importance of the
principles involved and his concurrence with Mellen's opinion.)69
The measures tested in Laboree and Lewis were blatant attempts by the legis-
lature to upset settled rights and to intervene in private disputes through retroac-
tive laws. When faced with challenges to regulatory acts, however, the court al-
most always deferred to the legislature. Lunt's case70 involved a challenge to the
state's police power to regulate the sale of liquor. The defendant claimed, among
other things, that a statute prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages without a
license violated his natural right, protected by the Maine constitution, to acquire,
possess, and protect property.7 1 Focusing on the legislative power to enact rea-
sonable laws, the court thought it "strange" that anyone would doubt the legislature's
authority to license sellers of so baleful a commodity as liquorY2 In any event, the
reasonableness of a law was a matter for legislative judgment. The court would
"not say that there may not possibly be exceptions to the generality" of this propo-
sition, but it was "not disposed to consider them as among the probabilities of
legislation."'73
InLunt's case, the Maine court laid the foundation for a practically unlimited
police power, but it also appeared to reserve the right to invalidate unreasonable
police legislation in extreme cases. Other judicial statements in support of a far-
reaching police power may be found in cases dealing with railroad regulations, 4
improvements to navigable rivers 7 5 and liquor laws.7 6 There appears to be only
one case before 1868 in which the court questioned the validity of a law enacted
under the police power. 7
As noted earlier, review of the reasonableness of police regulations was only
one of several forms of substantive judicial review. While the Maine court gener-
ally deferred to the legislature's police power, keeping the right of substantive
review in reserve and almost out of sight, in other areas it clearly claimed the
power to review the substance of legislation. While the court sustained the exer-
cise of the police power against claims that regulation of property amounted to a
68. Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. at 336. In Lewis v. Webb. the court based its decision primarily on
the separation of powers provided for in the Maine constitution. It held that propeay could not
be transferred from one person to another without either the consent of the owner or the judg-
ment of a court. See iU at 331-37.
69. See ia. at 337.
70. 6 Me. 412 (1830).
71. See id. at 412-13.
72. Il at 414.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Veazie v. Mayo. 45 Me. 560.564 (1858).
75. See, e.g., Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 358 (1850).
76. See, e.g., Gray v. Kimball, 42 Me. 299, 307 (1856); Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558, 560
(1852).
77. See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189,215-17 (1859) (declaring unconstitutional a statte in-
tended to facilitate the change of trains by passengers on the grounds that the legislature could
pass laws for the public convenience, as opposed to public safety, only when private rights
would not be impaired).
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taking without compensation in violation of the state constitution's eminent do-
main provision,7 8 the justices unequivocally insisted that the judiciary and not the
legislature had the authority to determine whether a particular taking of private
property was for a public purpose. Even in Moor v. Veazie,79 where the court
proclaimed that it could not question the reasonableness of legislation, the justices
reserved the power "to examine and decide upon" the character of a taking and
announced that it "would not be bound by any declaration of the Legislature, that
the property was taken for public use.' 80
The definition of "public use" or "public purpose" played an important role in
the rise of laissez-faire constitutionalism, often in the context of mill acts. Some
of these laws dated back to the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They
generally required that gristmill owners grind grain for all comers, regulated the
rates millers could charge, and granted mill owners eminent domain privileges. 81
The laws protected and encouraged mill owners by allowing them to take the prop-
erty of others across the stream from their own for dam construction, or to over-
flow the lands of others by backing up the streams, without fear of ruinous law-
suits. 82 They were justified on grounds of public necessity.83 For example, the
preface to the Virginia Act of 1667 declared that:
[I]t would conduce much to the convenience of this country, both for the grinding
of come and of neere roads if mills were erected at convenient places, which
diverse persons would willingly doe, if not obstructed by the perverseness of
some persons not permitting others, though not willing themselves to promote so
publique a good.84
By 1830, however, some of the mill acts, and corporate charters that granted
similar privileges, were being used to encourage manufacturing, and courts and
legal commentators had begun to question whether the acts and charters filled a
public need in the more developed society of the nineteenth century.85 After 1830,
profligate public investment in private canal and railroad companies, the misman-
agement of many ventures, and a dramatic rise in public debt led to a wave of state
constitutional amendments prohibiting governmental aid to private enterprise. 86
In Maine, an amendment of 1848 prohibited the state from lending its credit to
private corporations, though this did not stop municipalities from investing ex-
78. See Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403 (1835). The court later held that virtually nothing
short of a deprivation of title constituted a "taking" under the eminent-domain provision. See
Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 (1852).
79. 32 Me. 343 (1850).
80. Id at 361.
81. See, e.g., A COLLECTION OF ALL THE PuBuc AcTS OF ASSEABLY, OF THE Iovmcs Or Noni
CARo. A: Now IN FoRCE AND USE (1751), reprinted in, I THE EARLIEST PRumD LAws OF No=mi
CAROLuNA 1669-1751, 18-19 (1977)). See also Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-19
(1885).
82. See I NICHoLS, THE LAW Or EmnaNr DoMAIN §§ 1.22[8]-1.22[11] (1999).
83. See Joseph K. Angel], The Law of Water Privileges, 2 Am. JURIST & L. MAO. 25, 30-31
(1879).
84. See 2 WIjAM WALLER HEPN G, nM [VGMoAl] STATUTES AT LARGE 260-61 (1810).
85. See, e.g., Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364 (1814); Wolcott Woollen Mfg. Co. v. Upham, 22
Mass. 292 (1827). See also Restrictions Upon State Power in Relation to Private Property (pt.
4), 1 U.S.L. INTEIGEN ER & R-v. 91, 95 (1829); Angell, supra note 83, at 30-32.
86. See CARE GooDIUCH, GoveR1IENT PRoMOTION oF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-
1890, at 51-165 (1960).
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travagantly in railroad companies. (In 1878, another amendment would place a
ceiling on municipal debt) 87
In this atmosphere, the Maine court came close to overturning the State's Mill
Act, which, said the justices, "push[ed] the power of eminent domain to the very
verge of constitutional inhibition." 88 The Act authorized mill owners to build
dams that could flood other people's property and established a procedure to deter-
mine yearly damages. 89 In Jordan v. Woodward,90 the owner of a savmaill claimed
the incidental right to use the pond created by his dam.91 When competitors who
owned the flooded land tried to use the mill pond for their own purposes, prevent-
ing the miller from keeping his logs there, the miller sought an injunction. 92
Neither side actually contested the constitutionality of the Mill Act, but the
court, growing wary of excessive governmental aid to private business interests,
raised the issue on its own.93 The court noted that early in the country's history,
when mills were public necessities and capital was scarce, special legislation to
protect millers had been justified.94 But times had changed, and if the question
were new, it might well be doubted that the Mill Act was consistent with the emi-
nent domain clause of the state constitution.95 Although the court would not over-
turn an act so long acquiesced in by the citizens of Maine, 96 neither would it inter-
pret the Act's provisions to extend the privilege of mill owners to use the property
of others. The court refused to enjoin a landowner from using his property in any
manner that did not affect the miller's statutory right to control the mill stream's
water level.9 7
By stating that the Mill Act had once been justified but had lost its warrant due
to changing economic circumstances, 9 8 the court was really questioning the rea-
sonableness of thinking that the Act still served a public purpose. In doing so, the
court engaged in reasoning of the type normally associated with legislative delib-
erations. And although this particularAct enjoyed the shield of "great antiquity,'" 9
the court indicated that new legislative efforts to aid private enterprise would be
closely scrutinized and possibly invalidated. 10 0
The Maine court set a precedent of sorts with Jordan v Woodward. After the
Civil War, as judicial deference to legislatures appeared to be reaching a limit,
several state courts severely criticized the mill acts, either striking them down or
87. See id. at 132-34. See also Kau.mN,supra notE 42, at466-93; U tmA.LJ. TL, mYT
MAwE STAaE Co Ns-tmoN 144, 148 (1992).
88. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317,323 (1855). The case was decided by Democrat Rich-
ard Rice, who wrote the opinion, Republican John Appleton, a former Whig with pronounced
Jacksonian proclivities on legal and economic matters, and Whig John Tenney, who concurred
in the result. See supra note 57.
89. See Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. at 318.
90. 40 Me. 317 (1855).
91. See i at 318.
92. See d at 317.
93. See id. at 323.
94. See id.
95. See id
96. See id at 324.
97. See id at 325.
98. See id at 323-24.
99. Id at 324.
100. See id at 323-24.
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upholding them only because of their age or public acquiescence. 10 1 The Maine
court also anticipated decisions involving the validity of expenditures of public
funds, an issue that became controversial with the public financing of canals and
railroads. Pennsylvania Chief Justice Jeremiah Black's opinion in Sharpless v.
Mayor of Philadelphia10 2 is the best-known exposition of the principle that tax
revenues could be used only for public purposes, but the Maine court had taken it
for granted in Hooper v. Emery1 0 3 sixteen years earlier. A statute of 1837 had
authorized towns to use their portions of surplus federal funds returned to the states
by Washington as if the money had been raised by taxation. 104 One town voted to
distribute its share among local families on a per capita basis. 105 The court, in an
opinion by former Democratic United States Senator Ether Shepley, held that such
a distribution would violate "'principles of moral justice"'; if sustained, it would
justify the use of the taxing power to equalize the distribution of property, and that
in turn would subvert "individual industry and exertion" and render private prop-
erty insecure, in violation of the natural rights provision of the Maine Constitu-
tion. 10 6 Shepley also analogized the taxing power to eminent domain. 107 In lan-
guage foreshadowing that used in postbellum Maine decisions that have been cited
as classic examples of laissez-faire constitutionalism, Shepley declared that "[n]o
public exigency can require, that one citizen should place his estates in the public
treasury for no purpose, but to be distributed to those, who have not contributed to
accumulate them, and who are not dependant [sic] upon the public charity." 10 8
The immediate impact of Hooper v. Emery was limited. The statute itself was
not challenged, and in 1838 the legislature deleted the reference to taxation and
expressly authorized a per capita distribution of the surplus funds. 109 The signifi-
cance of Hooper, as of Jordan v. Woodward, lay in its articulation of the principle
that the substance of laws enacted pursuant to recognized legislative powers was
subject to judicial review under the public purpose doctrine.
Decisions of the Maine court before 1868 also foreshadowed substantive judi-
cial review on due process grounds. Although the Maine Constitution did not
include the term "due process" until 1963, it did ensure that no defendant in a
criminal proceeding would "be deprived of his life, liberty, property or privileges,
but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." 110 Nineteenth-century
courts regarded "law of the land" and "due process of law" as equivalent expres-
sions.
101. See The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:An Advance Requiem, 58 YAtZ L. J.
599, 605 (1949); 3 HERY Pmlu, FANHAm, Tm LAw op WA.TRms AN WAsm RiaHrs 2135-41
(1904).
102. 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
103. 14 Me. 375 (1837).
104. See id. at 376.
105. See id at 379.
106. Id. at 380.
107. See id
108. Id
109. See P.L. 1838, ch. 311, § 3.
110. ME. Cosr. art. I, § 6. The Maine Constitution also had a clause guaranteeing a "remedy
by due course of law" to every individual injured "in his person, reputation, property or immu-
nities." ME. COnST. art. I, § 19. Despite a hint in Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326,335 (1825), that this
provision might be interpreted substantively, the little construction it subsequently received was
strictly procedural in nature.
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It has been said that "[procedural due process regulates the action of courts;
substantive due process scrutinizes the acts of legislatures."111 As the Maine court's
decision in Inhabitants of Saco v. Wentworth112 shows, however, the distinction
was not always so clear. In Wentworth, the defendant had been convicted by a
justice of the peace of selling liquor illegally.113 A statute precluded the defendant
from appealing to ajury court until he had posted bond. 114 The court ruled that the
statute contravened the Law-of-the-Land Clause.1 15 The law of the land, said the
court, "does not mean an Act of the Legislature; if such was the true construction,
this branch of the government could at any time take away life, liberty, property
and privilege, without a trial by jury."1 16
Wentworth clearly involved a procedural matter, the trial rights of a criminal
defendant. In striking down a legislative act as a deprivation of a fundamental
right, however, the court used language later associated with substantive due pro-
cess.117 If due process could be used to protect the fundamental rights of criminal
defendants from legislative interference, it could also be used to guard the vested
property rights of law-abiding citizens.
The court made the transition ten years later in Adams v Palmer.118 A widow
who as a minor had released her dower during marriage subsequently sought to
recover it.119 At the time she commenced her action, releases by minors were
voidable, but while the suit was pending, the legislature passed a law providing
that the "release of dower by a married woman of any age, now or hereafter made,
... shall be valid." 120 The court ruled that the act, if applied to the plaintiff, would
unconstitutionally deprive her of her vested property right. 12 1 If the legislature
could take a widow's right to recover dower and give it to the reversioner, wrote
Chief Justice John Appleton:
[Tihe tenure by which her rights-by which all rights are held, depend, not on
the law as existing when they became vested, but upon the fluctuating will of a
legislative assembly. No rights are or can be secure. The arbitrary will of the
Legislature controls alike the past and the present, as well as establishes the law
for the future. 122
Ignoring the criminal context of the Law-of-the-Land Clause in the Maine
Constitution, the court in Adams cited Wentworth for the principle that this provi-
sion protected vested rights in property. The court observed that "law of the land"
did "'not mean a statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong. That con-
struction would render the restriction absolutely nugatory .... The people would
be made to say to the two houses .... you shall do no wrong unless you choose to
do it ' 123 In principle, Adams v. Palmer closely resembled that'locus classicus" 124
111. H ot M. Hm & Wn.Li M. WcEK EQuAu. Jus'ncE UEa LAw 481 (1982).
112. 37 Me. 165 (1853).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 166-67.
115. See id. at 176.
116. Id. at 171.
117. See id. at 172-73.
118. 51 Me. 480 (1863).
119. See id. at 172-73.
120. Id. at 488-89 (quoting P.L 1863, ch. 215, § I).
121. See i. at 487.
122. ad at 490.
123. Id at 490-91 (quoting Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)).
124. RAouLBERGER, GovEmu 'imNBy JuiaARY 254 (1977).
of substantive due process, Wynehamer v. People, 125 in which the New York court
treated due process as a substantive limitation on the police power.12 6
As cases from Laboree to Adams reveal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
found various doctrinal underpinnings for substantive judicial review before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. For all their deference to legisla-
tive authority and wisdom, the justices never relinquished the right to pass on the
substance of at least some types of legislation.
Wentworth andAdams may hold additional significance as well. According to
John E. Semonche and others, the economic due process cases of the late nine-
teenth century paved the way for the modem protection of fundamental rights via
substantive due process. 127 But the Maine cases suggest that substantive due pro-
cess protection of property and non-property rights developed simultaneously or
even in the reverse order.
1U. THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSITUTIONALISM, 1868-
1890
During the years that historians have regarded as the formative period of laissez-
faire constitutionalism, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reaffirmed its long-
standing power to review the substance of legislative adts when they infringed on
the fundamental rights of citizens. The justices continued to find this power in the
public purpose doctrine, whether applied to taxation or to eminent domain, in the
natural rights provision of the state constitution, and in due process of law. Those
statutes that the court invalidated often, though not always, dealt with governmen-
tal attempts to subsidize business enterprises.
The judges who issued these decisions remained a mixed group, though per-
haps less so than earlier.128 Republicans controlled every branch of government
almost continuously from the Civil War through the Progressive era, but they came
from a variety of social and educational backgrounds. There were men like Chief
Justice John A. Peters, the son of a wealthy merchant and shipbuilder and a gradu-
ate of Yale, who sat on the bench for twenty-seven years, and Peters' nephew,
Andrew P. Wiswell, educated at Bowdoin, whose father was a leader of the bar and
who succeeded Peters as chief justice. But there were also men such as Artemas
Libbey, Thomas Haskell, Amo King, Sewall Strout, William Fogler, and George
Haley, most of them farm boys, all of limited means, all educated in the common
schools of their towns, only some of whom made their way to college. In the cases
cited in this Article in which these men, whether of privileged or humble back-
ground, took part, there were almost no dissents. 129
In the historiography of laissez-faire constitutionalism, 1868 is a landmark
year. It was then that the Fourteenth Amendment, with its due process clause
125. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
126. See id. at 405-06.
127. See SEmoNcHE, supra note 12, at 425; KEYNES, supra note 32, at 212-15.
128. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
129. Maine's judges had no qualms about dissenting when they thought it necessary, but the
degree of unanimity on the issues discussed in this paper is startling. In all the cases cited, only
a few produced dissents. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. 505 (1857) (responding to
the Dred Scott case); True v. International Tel. Co., 60 Me. 9 (1872), infra text accompanying
notes 149-55; State v. Old Tavern Farm, 133 Me. 468, 180 A. 473 (1935), infra text accompany-
ing notes 197-200.
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applicable to the states, became a part of the U.S. Constitution. It was also in 1868
that Judge Thomas M. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations appeared in print.130
According to the traditional view of laissez-faire constitutionalism, Cooley's trea-
tise set forth a substantive definition of due process and supplied "laissez-faire
capitalism ... with a legal ideology ..... 13 1
Soon after the publication of Cooley's book, the Maine court produced three
opinions that historians have seen as classic, pioneering expressions of laissez-
faire constitutionalism, all of them written by Chief Justice John Appleton. 132
Appleton's devotion to laissez-faire economic principles is beyond dispute. But
neither he nor his associates on the Supreme Judicial Court subordinated constitu-
tional doctrine to business interests or used the power ofjudicial review to restrict
the regulatory power of the legislature.
The laissez-faire opinions of the early 1870s appeared at a time when state
governments throughout the nation were granting more and more special assis-
tance to private business enterprise. 133 In Maine, for example, the legislature au-
thorized towns to grant tax exemptions to manufacturing companies, the governor
urged state aid to industry, and Portland embarked upon a decade-long debacle in
railroad finance. 134
On a smaller scale, the residents of the Town of Jay voted in 1870 to loan
$10,000 to private entrepreneurs to induce them to move their new savmill and
box factory to the town and set up a grist mill. 135 The town needed legislative
authorization to implement its decision. 136 In 1871, the Supreme Judicial Court,
in an advisory opinion, emphatically denied that the legislature had the constitu-
tional power to permit towns to aid private manufacturers by gifts or loans. 13 7 The
legislature nevertheless authorized the Jay loan just fifteen days later. 138 A group
of the town's taxpayers thereupon brought suit to prevent the town from issuing
bonds to finance the loan. 139
In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay,140 the court declared the authorizing act uncon-
stitutional on several grounds. It found that manufacturing was not a public pur-
pose for which private property could be taken, whether through taxation or emi-
nent domain. 14 1 It also relied upon Maine's constitutional guarantee of the natu-
ral rights of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property." 142 How can prop-
erty be protected, asked Chief Justice Appleton, if the legislature can authorize the
130. THOMAS M. CooL.EY, ATREnsE ON THE Cox'surtmo L mrAnoNs wmcH REsT umo. The
LacLSAa PowERs oF Tin STATES oFmE AmmucAN UmoN (1868).
131. Twss, supra note 10, at 18.
132. See Brewer Brick Co. v. Inhabitants of Brewer, 62 Me. 62 (1873); Allen v. Inhabitants of
Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872); Opinions of the Justices, 58 Me. 590 (1871).
133. See Goodrich, supra note 43, at 430-33.
134. See Knua.AND, supra note 42 at 466-68, 478-86. See also EDWARD F. CHtsE, MAImE
RAU.RoAwS 52-58 (1926).
135. See Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. at 125.
136. See id. at 127.
137. Opinions of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 598 (1871).
138. $ee Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. at 127.
139. See id. at 125.
140. 60 Me. 124 (1872).
141. See id. at 130.
142. Mn CoNsT. art. I, § 1. See Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. at 142.
transfer of the property of all to a favored few via taxation and subsidization? 143
"All security of private rights, all protection of private property is at an end," he
declared, "when the power is given to a majority to lend or give away the property
of an unwilling minority." 144 Finally, Chief Justice Appleton, who in Adams v.
Palmer145 had given a substantive twist to Maine's law-of-the-land clause, 146 in-
voked that provision again in the Jay case. This clause, he argued, was meant to
protect the individual from "'the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-
ment."' 147 What could be more "arbitrary than the enforced collection of money
from one man to loan the same to another ' 14 8
Soon after Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, the court unanimously struck down tax
exemptions authorized by the legislature to encourage certain kinds of enterprise.
In Brewer Brick Company v. Brewer,149 the court observed that an exemption for
one individual or corporation meant the imposition of taxes to the extent of the
exemption on the rest of the population, forcing them "to add to the gains of a
capitalist without participating therein."15 0 "It can never be admitted," declared
the justices, "that the constitution of this State permits or allows the taxation of a
portion of its citizens for the private benefit of a chosen few .... 151
In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay and Brewer Brick Company v. Brewer, the court
struck down legislative policies intended to foster industry through loans of public
funds and tax exemptions for private enterprises. These decisions reflected the
justices' commitment to equality, not to the protection of business interests. But
whatever the justices' motivations might have been, and whatever constitutional
hooks they might have found on which to hang their decisions, they were engaging
in substantive judicial review.
There was one.other laissez-faire opinion at this time that merits mention.
The case of True v. International Telegraph Co. 152 arose when a businessman lost
a profit because his telegram accepting a contract offer, sent at the cheaper night
rate, was not delivered. 15 3 The telegraph company had included a clause in its
telegram blank that essentially exempted it from liability for failure to deliver night
messages. 154 Chief Justice Appleton, noting that "the general liberty to contract
is the highest policy," thought the clause enforceable, but not one other member of
143. See Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. at 134.
144. Id.
145. 51 Me. 480 (1863).
146. See id. at 490.
147. Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. at 138 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 235,244 (1819)).
148. Id. Of the justices who participated in Allen, all but one concurred in Appleton's opin-
ion. Joseph G. Dickerson concurred in the result for the reason stated in his response to the
legislature's inquiry of 1871. See Opinions of Justices, 58 Me. 590, 600-06 (1871). There, he
had found sanction for the public purpose doctrine in the constitution's requirement that legisla-
tion be for the defense or"for the benefit of the people of this State." Id. at 601. Laws had to be
for the direct benefit of the general public, he said, not for the pecuniary benefit of a select
group. See id. at 602. A municipality could not constitutionally impose a tax "to load the tables
of the few with bounty that the many may partake of the crumbs that fall therefrom." Id. at 603.
149. 62 Me. 62 (1873).
150. Id. at 75.
151. IL at 76.
152. 60 Me. 9 (1872).
153. See id at 10-11.
154. See id. at 11.
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the court agreed. 155 To the majority, freedom of contract meant little when the
lack of competition deprived the public of bargaining power. The majority found
telegraph companies to be quasi-public enterprises and the reasonableness of their
regulations a matter for the courts and not the companies to decide.156 And this
regulation, said the court, was unreasonable. 157
The telegraph case did not involve a legislative measure, but it indicates a
propensity on the part of a "laissez-faire court," the same court that rendered the
Allen and Brewer decisions, to exercise judicial authority to protect the public
from corporate power. Had the exculpatory clause been prohibited by law, even
Appleton probably would have upheld the act. In his dissent, he observed that the
clause did not conflict with the statutes regulating telegraph companies. 158 A few
years later, in the case of Meader v. MWte, 15 9 he sustained a statute that infringed
on liberty of contract by making contracts formed on Sundays unenforceable. 160
In this case, the defendant had refused to pay back money borrowed on a Sun-
day.16 1 'The moral obligation to repay money loaned is the same, whether the
loan be made on one day or another," wrote Appleton. 162 But, he added, it was an
"unfortunate condition" that the law refused "to aid in the enforcement of a debt
justly due" and the defendant was thus "rewarded for his wrong." 163
When faced with challenges to regulatory legislation, Maine's court, like most
courts of the late nineteenth century, interpreted legislative powers over business
enterprise very broadly. When the state's dominant railroad line, the Maine Cen-
tral, based a claim to tax exemptions on the charter rights of several older corpora-
tions from which it had been formed by consolidation, the justices vigorously sus-
tained the taxing power of the state. 16 4 Later, when the Boston & Maine objected
to a statute requiring it to build and maintain a highway crossing at its own ex-
pense, the court declared. "Corporations created for public purposes and invested
with large powers as railroad corporations are, can properly be required to do any
reasonable thing and to assume permanently any reasonable duty, which shall prom-
ise greater security from the dangers attendant upon the exercise of their pow-
ers." 165 In the process, the court explicitly repudiated its earlier holding that the
police power did not extend to matters of public convenience. 166
The Maine court's most "substantive" interpretations of due process in the
late nineteenth century came in cases such as Adams v. Palmer that had nothing
whatever to do with the regulation of business. 167 Moreover, language usually
155. rd. at 30.
156. See id. at 17.
157. See id. at 18-20.
158. See id. at 28-29 (Appleton, CJ., dissenting).
159. 66 Me. 90 (1876).
160. See id. at 92.
161. See id. at 91.
162. Id at 92.
163. Id.
164. See State v. Maine Cent R.R., 66 Me. 488, 494, aff'd subrwm., Railroad Co. v. Maine,
96 U.S. 499 (1877).
165. Boston & Maine R.R. v. County Comm'rs, 79 Me. 386,395- 96, 10 A. 113, 115 (1887).
166. See id. at 393, 10 A. at 114; see also supra note 77.
167. See Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (1863). Furthermore, the court employed egalitarian
language in cases that had nothing to do with public aid to private enterprise. See, e.g., Opinions
of the Justices, 44 Me. 505 (1857) (responding to the DredScott decision); Perkins v. Inhabitants
of Milford, 59 Me. 315 (1871) (payment of draft commutation fees with public funds).
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associated by historians with substantive due process appeared in cases apparently
dealing with procedural rights. In an early construction of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the court found that a statute that retroactively confirmed a grand jury in-
dictment issued in the interval between repeal and restoration of a court's criminal
jurisdiction violated both Maine's Law-of-the-Land Clause and the federal due
process provision. 16 8 The court declared that even a duly enacted law providing
for a regular course of judicial process for its administration might deprive persons
of rights without due process. If that were not so, the meaning of due process
"would be that no person should be deprived of... rights... unless the legislature
should pass an act authorizing it."'169
The court reaffirmed its substantive understanding of due process in 1885.
Although the justices rejected a due process challenge to a law authorizing the
judgment creditors of a town to levy on the property of the town's inhabitants, they
announced that not every statute was the "law of the land" and not every process
authorized by legislation was "due process"; a law or process "must not offend
against 'the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.""' 170
As the period commonly known as an era of substantive due process in the
U.S. Supreme Court approached, the Maine court both reserved its right to review
the substance of legislation on due-process and other grounds and continued to
recognize the legislature's broad power to regulate, but not subsidize, private busi-
ness enterprise.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUSINESS REGULAnON IN MAINE FROM 1890 TO THE
NEW DEAL
Scholars for a long time regarded 1890 as a watershed year in constitutional
history, the year in which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a substantive interpre-
tation of due process and ushered in an era of laissez-faire constitutionalism. It is
now clear, however, that neither the Supreme Court nor the state courts were an-
tagonistic toward regulatory legislation. Progressive legislatures passed a welter
of laws regulating business and the conditions of labor, provoking numerous chal-
lenges and opportunities for courts to review the laws. 17 1 In Maine, most of the
regulatory laws that came under fire during the supposed heyday of laissez-faire
constitutionalism, from 1890 to the New Deal, survived intact, as the Supreme
Judicial Court in those years gave wide latitude to the legislature. However, the
court retained its traditional power of substantive judicial review and occasionally
used it to invalidate legislation.
The court generally upheld traditional exercises of legislative authority: ordi-
nances prohibiting the sale of slaughtered carcasses without official inspection 172
and requiring that offal be carted only by a municipally approved individual; 17 3 a
liquor law174 and a statute limiting charges for grinding grain; 17 5 a grant of emi-
168. State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504, 510-12 (1872).
169. Id. at 509.
170. Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212, 222 (1885).
171. See FmNE, supra note 11, at 352-92 (surveying Progressive era regulatory legislation).
See also Kmtatrr L. HAL, THE MAGIC MmROR 196-209 (1989).
172. See State v. Starkey, 112 Me. 8, 90 A. 431 (1914).
173. See State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60A. 874 (1905).
174. See State v. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37, 63 A. 535 (1905).
175. See State v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102, 29 A. 947 (1893).
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nent domain power to a railroad company1 76 and an innkeeper licensing law. 177
The court also sustained an act creating water districts and empowering them to
condemn private water companies, 17 8 and refused to interfere, except on statutory
grounds, with rates established for such companies by the Public Utilities Com-
mission.17 9
Progressive labor laws met no resistance from the Maine court. Thejustices
unanimously upheld the employers' liability act of 1909, which narrowed the scope
of the fellow servant rule, and the more comprehensive workers' compensation act
of 1915.180 They impliedly approved a statute requiring weekly payment of wages
for certain employees. 18 1 Furthering another cause dear to the hearts of many
Progressives, conservation of natural resources, the court upheld a law requiring
licensing of wilderness guides 182 and, in an advisory opinion, approved a pro-
posed measure to regulate the cutting of trees on private, uncultivated land. 183
In upholding these legislative acts, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected nu-
merous due process and natural rights claims. Between 1890 and 1920, the court
tended to define legislative power in terms as broad as any it had ever used in the
past. It described the police power as the legislature's power "to provide for the
safety, protection, health, comfort, morals, and general welfare of the public" and
held that where the public health, safety, or morals were concerned, the police
power was superior to vested rights.18 4 The state could temporarily contract away
its regulatory authority in other instances, said the justices, but even then the sur-
render of power had to be absolutely clear. The court also adopted a broad defini-
tion of public purpose as it related to eminent domain and reaffirmed its pre-Civil
War position that a taking under the eminent domain authority meant a taking of
title, not mere regulation of property. 18 5
The theoretical underpinning for the court's expansive interpretation of legis-
lative power was its view that legislative authority was restricted only by clear
constitutional prohibitions. 186 The court rejected opportunities to read constitu-
tional text in amanner that would extend its own power of review. In upholding an
ordinance, passed pursuant to statute, that closed certain streets to automobile traf-
176. See Ulmer v. Lime Rock R.R., 98 Me. 579,57 A. 1001 (1904).
177. See Inhabitants of Dexter v. Blackden, 93 Me. 473, 45 A. 525 (1900).
178. See Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234,52 A. 774 (1902).
179. See, e.g., In re Island Falls Water Co., 118 Me. 397, 108 A. 459 (1919); In re Searsport
Water Co., 118 Me. 382, 108 A. 452 (1919); In re Guilford Water Co.'s Service Rates, 118 Me.
367, 108 A. 446 (1919).
180. See, e.g., Dirken v. Great No. Paper Co., 110 Me. 374, 86A. 320 (1913); Mailman v.
Record Foundry & Mach. Co., 118 Me. 172, 106 A. 606 (1919); Fish's Case, 118 Me. 489. 107
A. 32 (1919).
181. See State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 A. 578 (1916) (striking down a statute requiring
middlemen, who purchased milk for resale or for processing into other products, to pay produc-
ers semi-monthly on equal protection grounds but only after commenting that the offensive act
was not analogous to laws requiring corporations to pay employees at stated periods).
182. State v. Snowman, 94 Me. 99, 46 A. 815 (1900).
183. See Questions and Answers, 103 Me. 506, 69 A. 627 (1908).
184. State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 185, 60 A. 874, 876 (1905).
185. See, e.g., In re Searsport Water Co., 118 Me. 382, 108 A. 452 (1919); Ulmer v. Lime
Rock R.R., 98 Me. 579, 57 A. 1001 (1904); Questions and Answers, 103 Me. 506, 69 A. 627
(1908).
186. See Questions and Answers, 103 Me. 506, 69 A. 627 (1908).
fic, the justices wrote in State v. Mayo:187 "When the legislature has constitutional
authority to enact a law, and does enact it, the expediency of its enactment is not to
be passed upon by the court. The legislature determines if the law is reasonable,
and will promote the public welfare, and its determination is conclusive."'1 8 8
Perhaps the case that best exemplifies the attitude of the court toward legisla-
tive activity during the Progressive era is Laughlin v. City ofPortland, 189 in which
a Portland taxpayer questioned the public purpose of a municipal fuel yard that
sold wood and coal at cost. 190 The legislative power, ruled the court, must be
sufficiently elastic to meet the changing needs of society. 19 1 Laws that previously
had been adequate to secure public welfare might be inadequate now. 192 The
woodyard act was not a sign of paternalism or socialism, but simply a new exer-
cise of traditional legislative power. 193 Lauding the Laughlin decision a few years
later at the centennial celebration of the Maine bar, Associate Justice Albert M.
Spear declared that the court was conservative in maintaining substantive prin-
ciples of law, liberal in eliminating technicalities, and "progressive in applying old
rules to new conditions." 194
This is not to say that between 1890 and 1920 the Maine court never consid-
ered the reasonableness of legislation in its decisions. Even in State v. Mayo the
court observed, first, that the police regulation in question bore a reasonable rela-
tion to its supposed purpose, and, second, that even as a matter of policy the ordi-
nance was reasonable. 195 Nor would it be accurate to say that the court never
struck down regulatory laws; it did so at least three times in the early twentieth
century. In each instance, the court based its decision primarily on the principle of
equality, embodied now in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.196 The court also relied twice upon its power to define "public use" to
review the substance of existing or proposed legislation. In each instance, it re-
jected legislative attempts to aid private enterprise. 197
187. 106 Me. 62,75 A. 295 (1909).
188. Id. at 68, 75 A. at 298.
189. 111 Me. 486, 90A. 318 (1914).
190. See id at 487, 90 A. at 318-19.
191. See id at 492, 90A. at 324.
192. See id
193. See id at 493, 90 A. at 325.
194. MAwIE STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 57, at 188. See also MArNE STATE BAR Ass'N, supra
note 57, at 156 (remarks of Chief Justice Lucillius Emery upon his retirement).
195. See State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 69-70,75 A. 295,298-99 (1909).
196. In 1900 the court struck down a statute that denied peddler's licenses to aliens. See
State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 207, 47 A. 165, 169 (1900). Two years later, it overturned a
law requiring peddlers whose tax on stock came to less than twenty-five dollars to pay a license
fee, but exempting those who paid twenty-five dollars or more. See State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66,
75, 53 A. 887, 890 (1902). In 1916, the court declared unconstitutional a statute that required
producers of milk for use in resale or processing into other products to pay producers semi-
monthly; the court could see no reasonable basis for distinguishing between milk producers and
other producers. See State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 179, 98 A. 578, 579 (1916).
197. In the first case, the court enjoined an electric company from using its delegated power
of eminent domain to build power lines over private land for the purpose of supplying manufac-
turers with electricity. See Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 61 A. 785 (1905). On the second
occasion, the court advised the legislature that the lawmakers could not authorize the public
construction of reservoirs if the dominant, though unstated, purpose was to aid private enter-
prise. See In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 515, 106 A. 865, 872 (1919).
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The number of regulatory acts struck down by the United States Supreme
Court increased substantially after 1920.198 However, 1937 is often regarded as a
turning point, the year in which Justice Roberts' supposed "switch in time that
saved nine" signalled the end of laissez-faire constitutionalism and substantive
due process (at least with regard to economic legislation). 19 9 In Maine, there was
no such increase in declarations of unconstitutionality and therefore no dramatic
turnabout, although some regulations did fall. In the 1920s, the Supreme Judicial
Court invalidated a statute passed for the benefit of loggers200 and forced the dele-
tion of a building-line regulation from a zoning law.201 In 1930, it overturned an
order of the Public Utilities Commission that would in effect have transferred busi-
ness from one telephone company to another. 0 In 1935, a divided court struck
down as a denial of equal protection a statute requiring the proprietors of milk-
gathering stations to post a bond before being licensed. 203 But other economic
laws and administrative orders withstood challenge.204
In short, during the so-called era of laissez-faire constitutionalism, the Maine
court nullified very little economic legislation, and much of that was intended to
aid, not regulate, private enterprise. The court neither incorporated laissez-faire
economic theory into constitutional doctrine nor exhibited any special solicitude
for business interests. It did not, however, relinquish powers of substantive judi-
cial review that dated back to the beginning of statehood.
V. CONCLUSION
In his 1935 Pulitzer-Prize-winning history of American constitutionalism,
Andrew C. McLaughlin asserted that the judiciary of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries had "assumed burdensome obligations" by giving "a new sig-
nificance and force to the term 'due process."' 20 5 However, he also took note of
One commentator, in a study of the attempt by twentieth-century Maine Progressives to se-
cure public development of the state's water power, portrays the Supreme Judicial Court as a
stronghold of conservatism, opposed to the idea that reservoirs could be a "public use" and
determined to keep Maine's water resources in private hands. See Christopher S. Beach, Con-
servation and Legal Politics: The Struggle for Public Water Power In Afaine, 1900-1923, 32
ME. Hur. Soc'y Q. 150, 163-65 (1993). In fact, the court, per Chief JusticeAppleton, had long
before held that reservoirs served a public purpose. See Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Me.
91, 96-97 (1883). The particular schemes pushed by the Progressives, however, ran up against
the court's longstanding objection to the use of public funds to benefit private business.
198. See SroNcH-, supra note 12, at 423-25.
199. 2 ALREDA. KELLY sr A, THE AxmEucAN Cosinno.x 487-88 (7th ed. 1991). See also
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (regarded as the pivotal case ending laissez-
faire constitutionalism and substantive due process).
200. See Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 121, 136 A. 664, 667 (1927).
201. See In re Opinions of the Justices, 124 Me. 501, 128 A. 181, 185 (1925).
202. See Gilman v. Somerset Farmers' Coop. Tel. Co., 129 Me. 243, 151 A. 440,443 (1930).
203. See State v. Old Tavern Farm, 133 Me. 468, 180 A. 473,477 (1935).
204. See, e.g., In re Stanley, 133 Me. 91, 174 A. 93 (1934), aff'd 295 U.S. 76 (1935) (denial
of common carrier certificate by Public Utilities Commission); Gay v. Damariscotta-Newcastle
Water Co., 131 Me. 304, 162 A. 264 (1932) (water rates); Appeal of Bonstein, 126 Me. 532,
140 A. 194 (1928) (labeling of beverage bottle, revocation of license by Commissioner of Agri-
culture); Hamilton v. Caribou Water, Light & Power Co., 121 Me. 422, 117 A. 582 (1922) (water
rates).
205. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHuN, A CoNsTrnowAu HismRY m UNrrEw STrAs 756(1935).
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"the endeavor of the courts to attach judicial decisions to the principles of the past
rather than to inaugurate a revolutionary break in the continuity of constitutional
law."'20 6 The decisions of the Maine court cast doubt on McLaughlin's first state-
ment, but bear out the second. Any burdensome obligations that the court may
have acquired resulted more from the increased activity of the legislature than
from a new interpretation of due process. In any event, the court did not revolu-
tionize constitutional law. In view of the common perception that the constitu-
tional law of government-business relations underwent dramatic changes between
1868 and 1937, the Maine decisions reveal a surprising continuity of judicial doc-
trine and behavior from the early nineteenth century through the age of Spencer to
the New Deal. Judicial restraint coexisted with the judiciary's long-established
power to review the substance of legislation. The Supreme Judicial Court always
took for granted the power to strike down legislation on substantive grounds, and
always used it sparingly. Even judges devoted to laissez-faire economic theory
recognized the legislature's authority to regulate business in the public interest. If
the court overturned more laws after 1868, and elaborated upon due process in a
substantive manner, it was because more, and seemingly more partial or unreason-
able, laws were passed. But the court did not have to invent new powers to do this.
It already had at hand a stock of traditional constitutional concepts with which to
justify such nullification when necessary-concepts that were neither designed
exclusively for nor applied solely to economic legislation and that owed little, if
anything, to laissez-faire economic thought.
206. Id.
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